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The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary
Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge
A number of federal and state courts have recently ordered changes
in local land-use regulations on equal protection and due process
grounds.' The decisions are a response to the burdensome inequities
produced and perpetuated by many municipal land-use schemes,2 and
have created speculation that court action might eliminate or restrict
zoning practices which discriminate against racial minorities and the
poor.3 The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Dandridge v. Williame
and James v. Valtierra, however, have been interpreted by many as
a termination of this development-as an indication that the Court will
not expand equal protection doctrine to reach exclusionary zoning.6
Dandridge upheld the constitutionality of a Maryland statute which
placed a maximum limit on the amount of aid a family could collect
regardless of the number of children in the family. Valtierra held that
Article XXXIV of the California State Constitution, which required
a referendum before public housing could be built in a community,
did not violate the equal protection clause.7 This Note will argue,
however, that there are satisfactory constitutional rationales for over-
turning exclusionary zoning statutes left unaffected by these decisions.
Courts should distinguish Valtierra and Dandridge and stringently
1. See, e.g., Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Southern Alameda
Spanish Speaking Organization v. Union City [hereinafter cited as SASSO]. 424 F.2d 291
(9th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669
(W.D.N.Y. 1970), aird, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971);
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, _ A.2d _
(1971); Appeal of Girsh, 447 Pa. 237; 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Concord Twp. Appeal, 439
Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
2. See, e.g., 425 F.2d at 1037-1939; 318 F. Supp. at 697; 447 Pa. at 473-76, 268 A.2d at
768-69.
3. See Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HAv. L. RV. 1645 (1971);
Note, Zoning: Closing the Economic Gap, 43 TmPrE L.Q. 347 (1970).
4. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
5. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
6. Interview with Herbert Franklin of the National Urban Coalition, Nov. 8, 1971.
Mr. Franklin is the coordinator of the Exclusionary Land Use Clearing House Confer-
ences held quarterly at the National Urban Coalition offices in Washington, D.C. Mr.
Franklin reports that some of the chief strategists in the exclusionary zoning field believe
that Valtierra and Dandridge indicate that constitutional challenges to exclusionary land-
use practices are doomed to failure. Attorney General John Mitchell has indicated that
he believes that Valtierra signals that the Court will not move to end exclusionary zoning.
Mitchell Scorns Economic Integration of the Suburbs as Contrary to High Court, The
Courier-Journal and Times (Louisville, Ky.), June 6, 1971, at A-4, col. 1.
7. Article XXXIV applies only to publicly financed low-cost housing, not to other
types of government projects or to housing for any group other than low.income families.
402 U.S. at 139. Moreover, referenda are required for only a few other types of state
action in California. Id. at 142.
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scrutinize zoning statutes that exclude racial minorities or the poor
from access to housing within a community.
I. The Problem and the Need for Judicial Response
Zoning is exclusionary when the zoning laws of a community
seriously impede or absolutely prevent the construction of low-cost
housing. Suburban zoning laws often exclude high density, low-cost
apartments and trailer parks. This effectively leaves metropolitan area
poor and moderate-income familiess no alternative but to live in the
central cities. 9 At the same time that suburban zoning laws, building
codes, and other land-use barriers prevent these families from moving
out of the central cities, most of the new clerical, unskilled, and semi-
skilled jobs in metropolitan areas are being created in the suburbs.10
The low- and moderate-income families who live in the central cities
are thus segregated by land-use regulations from easy access to the
most rapidly growing job markets.
Another consequence is relative depletion of central city tax bases,
which must support locally funded services for the majority of the
8. The definitions of "poverty" and "moderate income level" are much in disput .
D. HAMILTON, A PRIMER ON THE ECONOMICS OF POVERTY 22-33 (1968). But for purposes
of this Note the Social Security Poverty Lines of $3,130 for a non.farm family of four
and $5,090 for a non-farm family of seven may be accepted. Id. at 31. Moderate income
family will be defined as those families with an income below S4,005 for a non.farin
family of four or below $6,395 for a non-farm family of seven. Id. at 31. This means
that approximately one fourth of all families living in Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas are of low or moderate income. H. SHEPPARD, POVERTY AND WEALTH iN AMERICA
8 (1970).
9. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 22 (Bantam
ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as KERNER REPORT]:
To continue present [land use] policies is to make permanent the division of our
country into two societies; one, largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities;
the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs ....
Of course, some suburbs have substantial numbers of low-income families. There are,
for example 180,000 poor families in the thirteen suburban counties ringing New York
City. Blumenthal, Suburban Poor Suffer Amid Environment of Affluence, N.Y. Times,
May 26, 1968, at 1, col. 4. However, the central cities contain a much higher proportion
of the poor than do the suburbs taken as a whole. See Schnore, The Socio.Economic
Status of Cities and Suburbs, AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 76 (1963). These differences do
not disappear with time. Rather, the socio-economic character of a suburb app.ears to
maintain itself over long periods. See, e.g., Brazer, Economic and Social Disparities Be.
tween Central Cities and Their Suburbs, 43 LAND ECON. 294 (1967); Farley, Suburban
Persistence, 29 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 38 (1964).
10. See Kain, The Distribution and Movement of Jobs and Industry, in THEIL Mrito-
POLITAN ENIGMA J. Wilson ed. 1967); KERNER REPORT, supra note 9, at 406.07; Shipler,
Lawsuit to Challenge Zoning as Discriminating Against Poor, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1969,
at 39, col. 1; Darnton, Big Business Draws Service Industries to Suburban Areas, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 22, 1971, at 1, col. 5, and 19, col. 1; Reeves, Loss of Major Companies in City
Conceded by Patton, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1971, at 33, col. 8.
Township of Mahwah, Docket No. A2592-70 (Super. Ct. of N.J., App. Div. 1971), a
case currently pending in the Superior Court of Bergen County, N.J., involves the con.
tention that a community must consider changing job patterns when making and ap.
plying its zoning laws.
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metropolitan area poor and near poor,"1 while exclusionary zoning
keeps suburban per resident tax bases high. The suburbs can thus
afford to maintain a much higher standard of municipal services. 12
The impact of exclusionary zoning falls most heavily on racial mi-
norities, since proportionately more blacks than whites are members
of low- and moderate-income families.1 3
It is becoming increasingly clear that the political strength of the
suburbs is sufficient to discourage the federal government from at-
tempting to break the barriers created by exclusionary zoning.24
11. See Downs, Alternative Futures for the American Ghetto, 97 DAEB.P.Lus 1336-38
(1968); Kain & Persky, Alternatives to the Guilded Ghetto, 14 PuLc LImsr 74 (9G9);
Stone, Bare Cupboard, Wall St. Journal, Dec. 30, 1970. at 1, col. 6; Hamilton. Blood is
Drawn as Lindsay Lays Off Employees, N.Y. Times, Nov. "-, 1970, § 4, at 5, col. 1.
12. Perhaps the most significant of these local services is education. Central city
public schools are poorly funded and staffed in comparison with suburban schools. See,
e.g., 1 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 13
(1967) and U.S. CoMIsssloN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DEMOGAI-nic, EcONOMIC, AND SOCIAL CHAR-
ACTERIsTrcs OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS AND ST. Louis Cou.%rY, Appendix C. Table 2 (1967).
Further, one study revealed that the educational and income levels of clasmates' families
are more important than the teacher's education or expenditure on school facilities in
contributing to the excellence of a student's education. J. CoL-,6tAN r At-, EquALrn' oF
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 22 (1966). Such findings stress the importance of getting the
children of low-income families into suburban schools where their classmates wvill be
from "educationally motivated" families. See Downs, Alternative Futures for the Amneri.
can Ghetto, 97 DAEDALUS 1336-38 (1968). KxmER REPORT, supra note 9, at 399. If the
Coleman analysis is correct, then in order to give the children of the poorly educated
low and moderate-income central city families an education approaching the excellence
of that received by suburban children it will be necessary to place them in schools with
the suburban children.
13. The distribution of families by income indicates that in 1968 the proportion of
non-white families (44.6%), which fell into income ranges eligible for low.rent public
housing (under $4,999) was over twice that for white families (19.9%). DEP'r OF Co.St-
MERCE, BUREAU OF THE CE.sus, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTs (Series P-60, Nos. 53 and
59, 1970). In 1968, using the poverty index of the Social Security Administration, over
28% of non-white families in the nation were poverty stricken compared to only. 8, of
the white families. 1968 HUD STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, at Table 33 (based on preliminary
data of Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census). See also NATIONAL CoMIStSION
ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 45 (1968). The 1970 census figures
show that in the nation as a whole black families have an average income only 61%
that of white families. Rosenthal, Census Data Show Blacks Still Poor, N.Y. Times, Feb.
12, 1971, at I, col. 8 and 24, col. 6. Only 4.5% of the suburban population is black, while
blacks compose 23% of the central city population and over 11% of the national popu-
lation. Rosenthal, More Blacks in Suburbs, but Ratio Stays Stable, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1l,
1971, at I, col. 5 and 24, col. 1. Moreover, the percentage of blacks in the suburbs is not
increasing, while it is increasing rapidly in the central cities. Id. The PRmsIDET's SEcoxn
ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONAL HOUSING GOALS, H.R. Doc. No. 292, 91st Cong., 2d Sen.
42 (1970) stated:
[I]t is difficult, if not impossible in many communities to find sites for low- and
moderate-income housing because the occupants will be poor, or will be members
of a racial minority, or both. The consequence is that either no low- or moderate-
income housing is built or that it is built only in the inner city, thus heightening
the tendency for racial polarization in our society ....
14. The Nixon administration has even been reluctant to push for federal funding
of low-cost housing in those suburbs where zoning laws permit high density housing but
public sentiment is against it. During the first nine months of 1970 Secretary Romney
had initiated plans to place federally subsidized housing in the suburbs. His efforts,
however, have met with very limited success, apparently because of strong opposition
from within the Nixon administration. See Herbers, Challenge to "White Power' in the
Suburbs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1970, § 4, at 5, col. 4; Herbers, Mitchell is Said to Advise
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Although a very few states and metropolitan areas have moved to
overcome exclusionary zoning,l5 the poor will probably receive little
relief unless the courts act.
Romney to Take New Post, Dispute on Housing Policy Reported, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22,
1970, at 1, col. 5.
The following exchange occurred at a presidential news conference on December
10, 1970:
Q. Mr. President, concerning Governor Romney's plan, to what extent does the
Federal Government use its leverage to promote racial integration in suburban
housing?
A. Only to the extent that the law requires. In two cases, as a result of acts passed
by the Congress, that [sic] the Federal Government not provide aid to housing or
to urban renewal where a community has a policy of discrimination and has taken
no steps to remove it.
On the other hand, I can assure [sic] that it is not the policy of the Government to
use the power of the Federal Government or Federal funds, in any other way, in
ways not required by the law for forced integration in the suburbs. I believe that
forced integration in the suburbs is not in the national interest.
6 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1650, 1653 (Dec. 14, 1970) (empha-
sis added). See also Rosenthal, President Reaffirms Opposition to Forced Suburban Inte-
gration, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1971, at 19, col. 4.
In his June, 1971, statement on equal housing opportunity, President Nixon echoed
his earlier position by stating that his administration "will not seek to impose economic
integration upon an existing local jurisdiction .... ." Federal Policies Relative to
Equal Housing Opportunity, Statement by the President, 7 WEEKLY COMPILATION Or'
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 892, 900 (June 14, 1971). However, he did indicate that his
administration might work against land-use regulations which have a racially discril.
natory impact:
[W]e will not countenance any use of economic measures as a subterfuge for racial
discrimination.
When such an action is called into question we will study its effect, If the effect
of the action is to exclude Americans from equal housing opportunity on the basis
of their race, religion or ethnic background, we will vigorously oppose it by whatever
means are most appropriate-regardless of the rationale which may have cloaked
the discriminatory act.
Id. This passage suggests that the Nixon administration might act against land.use
laws which have the effect of racial discrimination in the housing field regardless of
discriminatory intent. But President Nixon contradicts himself by suggesting that the
federal government will act only against communities which have a racially discrimina.
tory motivation for passing or enforcing their zoning laws. Id. at 904.
On the other hand, there have been two recent initiatives by the Nixon administration
which show that it is taking some affirmative action toward dispersing low-income ahd
racial minority people outward from the central city ghettos. The Justice Department
has joined in a suit to compel Black Jack, Missouri, a St. Louis suburb, to accept a
low-income housing project. United States v. City of Black Jack, Civil Action No. 716
372 (A) (E.D. Mo., 1971). The Department of Housing and Urban Development has
proposed new site selection criteria for funding rent supplement and low-rent supplement
applications. Proposed HUD Reg., 36 Fed. Reg. 19316 (1971). If these regulations are
adopted they will give HUD funding priority to sites which will act to disperse low.
income and racial minorities into affluent areas of the central cities and into the sub.
urbs. But see Warren Keeps Most of Its Castles Intact and Open Communities: Frozen
Federal Levers, CITY MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 1971, at 72, 77.
Racial and class discrimination are often inextricably related. Indeed, racial discrimi-
nation may often be best explained as based upon class discrimination, i.e., race is often
only a shorthand means of identifying certain social and economic classes. Blacks may
receive poor treatment in part because they are assumed to have the traits of poor
persons, even if their behavior is, in reality, the same as middle class whites, See E.
BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY 63, 75-78 (1970); M. GoRDoN, AssI. InATION IN AMEst.
CAN LIFE 46, 51-52 (1964); Bloom, Whiteman, & Deutsch, Race and Social Class as
Separate Factors Related to Social Environment 70 Am. J. SOCIOL. 471, 476 (1965).
15. Currently Massachusetts is the only state which requires that its towns permit
a quota of land to be developed for moderate and low.cost housing. MAss. GEN. LAwS
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IL Legal Arguments Against Exclusionary Zoning
The arguments against exclusionary zoning have been based pri-
marily on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and to a lesser extent on the due process clause of the Fourteenth and
Fifth Amendments.'6 Recent state and lower federal court decisions
indicate that some courts are willing to respond to these arguments
and to restrict local zoning powers in order to accommodate the press-
ing social need for low- and moderate-cost housing in the suburbs.
A. Due Process
A few state courts have ruled against exclusionary zoning practices
on due process grounds. Several recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court
cases set forth the rule that a city must normally permit every type
ch. 408, § 2023 (1969). However, New York has given its Urban Development Corpora-
tion the power to override local zoning ordinances for certain low-cost housing projects.
See New York State Urban Development Corporation Act, N.Y. UNco.NsoL. LAW § 625
(McKinney 1968). See also To The Legislature: A Blueprint for Housing in Ncw Jersey,
A Special Message by William T. Cahill, Governor of New Jersey, Dec. 7, 1970 (mimeo.
on file with the Yale Law Journal). A metropolitan regional agreement has been reached
in the Dayton, Ohio, area, in which most of the suburbs have agreed to build some
low-cost housing. Herbers, Suburbs Accept Poor in Ohio Housing Plan, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 21, 1970, at 1, col. 2 and 42, col. 1. On the future prospects for state legislation to
end exclusionary zoning, see Testimony of Professor David Trubek Before the United
States Civil Rights Commission (June 15, 1971) (on file at the Yale Law Journal).
16. It has also been suggested that impediments to the building of low-cost housing
are a violation of the constitutional right to travel. See Note, Zoning: Closing the Eco-
nomic Gap, 43 TmrpLE L.Q. 347, 353, 354 n.42 (1970); Brief for the National Urban
Coalition et al. as Amicus Curiae at 46-52, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as NUC Brief]. The right to travel has been based on various parts of the
Constitution, including the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, § 2. the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the commerce clause
and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. It has also been considered a
fundamental right which flows from the general principles upon which the constitution
is based. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8, 631 (1968).
The right to travel announced in Shapiro encompassed not only the right to pass
from state to state, but also the right to settle in whatever state a citizen might choose
regardless of his wealth. A de facto barrier to the building of low-cost housing inhibits
interstate movement of poor and moderate-income families just as the welfare residency
requirement declared unconstitutional in Shapiro did. The cumulative effect of the exclu-
sionary zoning of the suburban rings around major cities is to deny many potential
poor and moderate-income migrants to a state the opportunity to send their children
to quality public schools and convenient access to suburban job markets. A denial of
access to the suburbs is a denial of the right to personal and family advancement stem-
ming from a change in residence which is the essence of the right to travel.
Although the right to travel argument has occasionally been presented to courts in
zoning cases, no court has explicidly dealt with it in the zoning context. And, in fact,
there are difficulties in extending right to travel doctrine to exclusionary zoning. First,
the "fit" of the welfare legislation in Shapiro and the pauper legislation in Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), to those poor who wished to move to a different state
was much tighter than the exclusionary zoning "fit." Most people, even poor people, can
find some place to live in another state regardless of the other state's zoning laws.
Second, zoning laws apply to long time residents of a state or community as well as those
outside. Unlike Shapiro and Edwards, the impact of exclusionary zoning does not exclu-
sively fall upon migrants.
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of land-use somewhere within its boundaries.' 7 Other state courts
have decreed that cities must permit trailer parks,' 8 apartment build-
ings,19 or buildings of small floor space.20 The underlying rationale
of these decisions is that, to be a valid use of the police power, zoning
must further the general welfare; and that population pressures and
the exacerbation of the urban-suburban dichotomy have altered what
may count as advancing the general welfare. They indicate that "gen-
eral welfare" must include more than the needs or desires of the
majority of the present citizens of an individual suburb and that the
need for intensive land development to accommodate current metro-
politan population pressures is sufficient to establish that exclusionary
zoning regulations are not always consistent with the general welfare.
The possibility that this substantive due process rationale will be
employed by federal courts is remote.2 1 But state due process zoning
decisions are nonetheless significant, both for their local impact and
17. See Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land
and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
For comment on this line of cases, see Note, Zoning: Closing the Economic Gap, 43
TEMPLE L.Q. 347 (1970). "Economic due0 process" is still an active doctrine in state
courts. See, e.g., Opinions of the Justices, 322 Mass. 755, 760, 761, 79 N.E.2d 883, 887, 888
(1948); Carpenter, Economic Due Process and the State Courts, 45 A.B.A.J. 1027 (1959);
Monaghan, The Constitution and Occupational Licensing in Massachusetts, 41 B.U.LRv.
157, 160 (1961).
18. See, e.g., Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will, 114 I1. App. 2d 267, 252 N.E.
2d 765 (1969).
19. See Id.; Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11,
A.2d - (1971).
20. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Burke, 9 Ariz. App. 395, 452 P.2d 722 (1969); Cf.
Renshaw v. Coldwater Housing Comm'n, 381 Mich. 590, 165 N.W. 2d 5 (1969); Elizabeth
Lake Estates v. Waterford Twp., 317 Mich. 359, 26 N.W. 2d 788 (1947).
21. The pre-Roosevelt Court was willing to rule against zoning statutes on due process
grounds. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). However, the Court's
unwillingness to revive substantive due process in the zoning field has frequently been
demonstrated. For example, appeals were dismissed in cases which upheld a three-acre
minimum lot size, Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W. 2d
771 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 802 (1952) and large floor-space minimums for
homes in an area of over twenty-five square miles, Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township
of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953), against
due process challenges. Cf. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). But see
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Similarly, most state courts follow the rule
that zoning regulations are presumed to be a valid use of the police power unless shown
to be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. They have usually upheld large minimum lot
size requirements against due process challenges. See, e.g., Flora Realty S& Inv. Co. v.
City of Ladue, supra, (three acres); Napa Valley United Farmers v. County Bd. of Super-
visors, No. 24, 961 (Napa County Calif. Super. Ct. 1970) (twenty acres in order to preserve
agriculture); Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942) (one
acre). See generally Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040 (1963); Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Coln.
munity Growth on the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 370, 383-84. Large minimum
floor area requirements are also generally upheld against due process challenges. See
Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, supra; Note, Snob Zoning-A Look at the
Economic and Social Impact of Low Density Zoning, 15 SYvAcusE L. REV. 507, 511-12
(1964). Even complete prohibition of apartment building is sometimes upheld. In
Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955), zoning of an entire village
for single family housing was held not invalid per se.
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as part of an evolving judicial recognition that it is necessary foi
communities to consider metropolitan land-use needs when applying
local zoning laws.
B. Equal Protection
The central legal argument of those who oppose exclusionary zoning
has been that it violates the equal protection clause.22 They argue
that exclusionary zoning statutes must be measured by a compelling
state interest 3 rather than a rationality standard because such statutes
discriminate against two classes entitled to special judicial protection,
racial minorities and the poor, and deny citizens their "fundamental
interest" in housing. Opponents of exclusionary zoning contend, in
this connection, that the compelling state interest test applies when the
effect of a zoning statute is to discriminate against a racial minority
or the poor, although the legislators who passed the zoning law may
not have had a discriminatory motive or purpose. It has also been
suggested that the presence of certain combinations of classifications
or interests, no single one of which is "suspect" or "fundamental,"
may operate jointly to impose a more stringent standard of judicial
review. These various contentions may usefully be accorded separate
treatment.
1. Race as a Suspect Classification
When a zoning regulation explicitly states that a racial minority is
a "nuisance" to be excluded from an area, it clearly violates the equal
protection rights of the zoned-out minority.24 But it is currently un-
decided whether the statistically demonstrable racial impact of exclu-
sionary zoning is sufficient to impose the compelling state interest
test without a showing of racially discriminatory purpose or motive
22. See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Pro-
tection, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79
Yale L.J. 896 (1970). For case support, see, e.g., Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037
(10th Cir. 1970); SASSO v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), afJ'd, 436 F.2d
108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). See also Michelman, The Advent
of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5 HARv. Civ. Riwirrs-Civ. LiD. L. REV. 207
(1970); Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Consti.
tutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CAuF. L. REv. 305 (1969) (application
of equal protection doctrine to education).
23. In only the World War II Japanese internment cases has the Court ever held that
governmental action furthered a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United
States, 323 US. 214 (1944).
24. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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on the part of those who passed the zoning statute or those who ad-
minister it. In zoning litigation it is often impossible, and always very
difficult, to prove that zoning boards had a racially discriminatory
motive or purpose.- - Therefore, if racial discrimination arguments
are to succeed in a zoning context, they will depend on a determination
that a showing of racially discriminatory effect of zoning laws is suf-
ficient to trigger the compelling state interest standard of judicial
review.
There have been a few lower court decisions which hold or suggest
that a showing of racially discriminatory effect is sufficient to require
stringent equal protection review.20  In Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Organization [SASSO] v. Union City, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit declared that the environmental control pur-
pose claimed by the city in excluding a housing project which would
have been inhabited mainly by Mexican-Americans was "perfectly
legitimate." 27 It refused to examine the motives of the Union City
residents who voted by referendum not to grant the plaintiff organi-
zation a zoning variance for a low-cost housing project, on the grounds
that it is practically impossible to determine motivation. The court
looked instead to the impact of the zoning referendum as the basis
25. The dictionary defines "motive" as "something that prompts a person to act In
a certain way or that determines volition; incentive." THE RANDOM HoUsE DIarIONARY
OF THE ENCLISH LANGUAGE (unabridged ed. 1967). This Note uses "purpose" to mean the
effect which the lawmakers or administrators expect to accomplish by the making or
administration of the law. It should be observed, however, that courts generally use
"motive" and "purpose" interchangeably. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 383 (1968); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1216 (1970). For a discussion of judicial treatment of legislative and
administrative purpose and motive, see Ely, supra. Zoning Boards can frequently dein
onstrate that their main criteria for zoning regulations were environmental.
26. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968),
involved rehousing those displaced by urban renewal. The court recognized that statutory
provisions providing for rehousing were on their face neutral between races. The ad.
ministrative agency charged with rehousing the displaced had also spent approximately
equal time trying to place black and white persons. However, because of conditions in
the housing market which made it much more difficult to find new housing for blacks
than for whites, the effect of the rehousing legislation and its administration was to
find housing for a much higher percentage of displaced whites than of displaced blacks.
The effect was unequal and, therefore, the court concluded, the equal protection rights
of the blacks were violated. Norwalk CORE relied heavily on Hobson v. Hansen, 269
F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub. non. Smuck v. Hobson, 395 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.
1968), in which the court found that an unconstitutional de facto discriminatory effect
had resulted from the neighborhood schools and tracking policies followed by the
Washington, D.C. Board of Education:
The complaint that analytically no violation of equal protection vests unless the
inequalities stem from a deliberately discriminatory plan . . . is simply false. What-
ever the law was once, it is a testament to our maturing concept of equality that,
with the help of Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, we now firmly recognize
that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to
private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme.
269 F. Supp. at 497.
27. 424 F.2d 291, 295 (1970).
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for its decision to remand the case to the district court for factual
findings and remedy. Its concern was that the effect of the zoning
ordinance may have been to "deny housing and an integrated environ-
ment to low-income residents."28
The Supreme Court has not yet resolved this issue. The Court has
declined to reverse a recent lower court decision which held that
zoning laws that have a racially discriminatory effect violate the equal
protection clause. Certiorari was denied in Kennedy Park Homes v.
Lackawanna,29 where the Second Circuit had ordered the city to re-
move its freeze on subdivision development and issue a variance to
allow the building of a low-cost housing project to be inhabited
principally by blacks. But the Court has not articulated criteria for
reviewing state action which has a racially discriminatory impact.30
2. Classification by Wealth and the Interest in Housing
Exclusionary zoning clearly strikes most heavily against the poor.
At least one exclusionary zoning case, SASSO, appears to treat wealth
as a suspect classification.3' It is also clear that the Supreme Court is
willing to declare suspect some types of classifications which disad-
vantage the poor.32 Proponents of this trend argue that the poor, like
28. Id. at 295-96.
29. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). The Second
Circuit held that racially discriminatory effect is by itself sufficient to require a "suspect
classification" test:
Even were we to accept the City's allegation that any discrimination here resulted
from thoughtlessness rather than a purposeful scheme, the City may not escape
responsibility for placing its black citizens under a severe disadvantage which it
cannot justify.
Id. at 114. In an alternate holding the court upheld the district court's finding that the
city's refusal to allow the project to go forward was based on "racial motivation," and
that effect is an important element of proof for showing motive. Id. at 112.
30. See pp. 73-76 infra.
31. 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). The court of appeals opinion in SASSO repeatedly
coupled its references to "low-income family" and racial minorities. But the court does
not make clear its thoughts on classification by wealth. It does not cite any of the
voting rights or criminal appeal cases (cited in note 32 infra) as precedents, nor does it
sufficiently divorce its language about low-income and racial minorities to assure the
reader that it considers the former to be a suspect classification. The court of appeals
returned the case to the district court for a finding of facts and imposition of remedies.
Judge Sweigert, in his district court opinion, SASSO v. Union City, Civil No. 51590
(N.D. Cal., July 30, 1970), appears to interpret the circuit court's holding as a declara-
tion that classification by wealth is suspect. He does not religiously combine the race
and wealth classifications as did the circuit court, but instead often deals 'ith low-income
citizens alone as the class discriminated against. Id. at 20, 21, In Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.
3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), the Supreme Court of California held
classification by wealth to be suspect.
32. See, e.g., Sager, supra note 22, at 774-80; Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal
Protection, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645, 1657-62 (1971). Those who argue that the Court is
establishing wealth as a suspect classification usually point to a group of voting rights
and judicial rights cases. In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. G63 (1966),
the Court declared that indigents could not be deprived of the right to vote because
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racial minorities, are in need of special protection if they are not to
be exploited by the rest of society and deprived of basic political and
judicial rights as well as educational and employment opportunities.3
Indeed, classification by wealth, though usually de facto, seems to
share with classification by race the characteristic of being "invidious."
Both types of classification may be used by a majority of society to
oppress a minority or to stigmatize a group in society as inherently
inferior, and both classifications are frequently unnecessary to the
pursuit of any valid governmental objective.3 4 Judicial reluctance,
thus far, to accept this argument completely may derive from the fact
that while race is a permanent attribute, poverty is thought to be a
transitory state of being from which one or one's children can pass
with hard work. The Court's difficulty in deciding which wealth
classifications are suspect may thus be attributable to the paradoxical
position society takes with respect to wealth. Our society at once em-
braces both the principle that every man is entitled to equal oppor-
tunity for social and economic advancement and the principle that
distinctions based on wealth are normal and even desirable as in-
centives.3 5 The Court cannot avoid wrestling with this paradox in its
attempt to define which wealth classifications should prompt stringent
constitutional review.
Another closely related approach to protecting the poor focuses on
the means necessary for economic and social advancement. Although
the Court has not yet held housing to be a fundamental interest 0 it
has declared that certain rights essential for effective participation in
our judicial and political systems must be made available to all citizens
regardless of their ability to pay.3 7 At least one of these fundamental
of inability to pay a poll tax. In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), It held that
indigents had to be provided with legal counsel to help prepare criminal appeals. See
also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). See also McDonald v. Board of Election Comn'rs, 391
U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (dictum):
[A] careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn
on the basis of wealth or race, . . . two factors which would independently render
a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny.
33. See pp. 62-64 supra.
34. See generally Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Pro.
tecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. RE V. 7, 20, 21 (1969).
35. For a discussion of this paradox, see J. GARDNER, EXCELLENCE 21-29 (1961).
36. However, the Court has declared housing to be a matter of special judicial con.
cern. See Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-44 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 585 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10
(1948).
37. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 628.31 (1969); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956).
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interests-the right to vote3 -- shares with access to suburban housing
the characteristic of being an important means of social and economic
mobility. Lower courts have been willing to hold that housing and
education are fundamental interests precisely because they afford ac-
cess to a decent life.3 9 The fundamental interest approach may be
the most sensible way to provide every citizen with a minimum level
of those thing essential to upward social and economic mobility.
Concentration on the means of social and economic advancement
themselves, Professor Michelman has argued, would direct the Court's
attention toward the basic ethical problem of defining a guaranteed
minimum standard of living, and would free it from the very difficult
task of defining what types of wealth classifications are suspect.40
3. Sliding Scale Argument
Under the "sliding scale" approach, various classifications and inter-
ests are visualized as being on a gradient, with the standard of review
becoming more demanding as the nature of the classifications or the val-
ue of the interests approaches the "suspect!' or "fundamental" levels.41
38. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
39. The court of appeals opinion in SASSO can be interpreted as regarding housing
as a fundamental interest:
Given the recognized importance of equal opportunities in housing, it may well be,
as matter of law, that it is the responsibility of a city and its planning officials to
see that the city's plan as initiated or as it develops accommodates the needs of its
low-income families ....
424 F.2d at 295-96. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584. 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971), held that education is a fundamental interest. A recent Minnesota Federal District
Court opinion follows Serrano in declaring education to be a fundamental interest and
wealth to be a suspect classification. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 40 US.L.W. 2228 (D. Minn.
Oct. 26, 1971).
40. See Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5
HARv. Civ. RIGHTS.--Cv. LrB. L. REV. 207 (1970); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amaendment, 83
H.Rv. L. REv. 7 (1969).
41. See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HAiv. L. REv. 91, 95 (1966); Comment, De-
velopments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1120 (1969).
In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968), the Supreme Court seemed to propose
a sliding scale approach. The Court held that
[i]n determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Claise,
we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the
State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by
the classification.
393 U.S. 23 at 30 (1968). Justice Marshall apparently relied upon such an approad in
his Dandridge dissent:
In my view equal protection analysis of this case is not appreciably advanced by the
a priori definition of a "right," fundamental or otherwise. Rather, concentration
must be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative
importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental
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The suspect and fundamental qualities of the classifications created
and the interests regulated by a specific state action are evaluated and
weighed together in determining the standard of judicial review to
be applied. This approach frees the court from the artificial strictures
of an all-or-nothing analysis vis-a-vis particular classifications and in-
terests and allows it to impose stringent judicial scrutiny on certain
classifications in combination with some interests but not others. It
would permit courts to strike down that state action affecting low-
income families which it regards as particularly pernicious while
allowing other wealth classifications to stand. SASSO can be viewed
as suggesting that classification by wealth, though not necessarily sus-
pect by itself, and an interest in housing, though not necessarily
fundamental by itself, when combined call for a higher standard of
judicial scrutiny than would either independently.42
III. The Impact of Valtierra and Dandridge on Equal
Protection Doctrine
Despite cries of despair to the contrary,43 Dandridge and Valtierra
do not signal an end to the relevance of equal protection doctrine in
assessing the constitutionality of exclusionary zoning laws. In fact,
the arguments outlined above are still available, for the holdings in
Valtierra and Dandridge are not dispositive of the root issues in ex-
clusionary zoning cases. Analysis of those two cases will be placed in
the same framework as the foregoing general analysis of the equal
protection challenge to exclusionary zoning.44
benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of
the classification.
397 U.S. at 520-21 (1970).
It is evident that certain types of classifications tend to be more invidious than others,
For example, in recent years labor unions have done quite well in preventing, through
the political process, governmental action which discriminates against unions or against
their members, while racial minorities have not been successful in preventin govern.
mental action which disadvantages them. The likelihood that state action is directed at
hindering the ability of various groups to participate in the burdens and benefits of
society on an equal basis with other citizens varies greatly among classifications. Similarly,
interests may be more or less important or fundamental. For example, the right to vote
is an essential means of protecting and advancing a group's welfare. The interest in equal
access to state owned recreation facilities which charge admission fees is clearly less crucial
for social and economic advancement. Housing would seem to warrant a relatively high
rating on this scale.
42. See 424 F.2d at 295-96. In Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.Sd 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971), the California Supreme Court appears to have employed the sliding
scale approach when it found the combination of classification by wealth and interest
in education to require the compelling state interest test.
43. See note 6 supra.
44. See Section IIB supra.
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A. Race as a Suspect Classification
At first glance Valtierra appears to reject the proposition that a
land-use law which has a racially discriminatory effect may violate the
equal protection clause. Justice Black, writing for the five-man ma-
jority, stressed that the referendum procedure utilized in Valtierra was
neither racially discriminatory on its face nor clearly discriminatory
in purpose. It applied to all publicly financed low-cost housing, "not
only [to] . . . projects which will be occupied by a racial minority. '"r
Nor, Justice Black emphasized, did "the record.., support any claim
that a law seemingly neutral [with respect to race] on its face is in
fact aimed at a racial minority."40 Valtierra might, therefore, be in-
terpreted as advancing the rule that only legislation which is racially
discriminatory on its face or is racially motivated triggers the stringent
scrutiny applied to suspect classifications.
The Court's refusal to rule on the basis of racially discriminatory
impact may, however, have been prompted by a desire to avoid
announcing a standard which would have extremely broad implica-
tions. Indeed, the majority opinion emphasized that the Court will
not attempt to make all government decisions affect all individuals
equally.47 To accept the discriminatory effect argument without quali-
fication, the Court implied, would be to set a precedent that stringent
judicial scrutiny is required whenever the impact of a statute falls
disproportionately upon members of a racial minority.48 Such a
sweeping standard would plainly be difficult to contain. It would
require a compelling state interest to justify state action, including
remedial49 and other programs in a wide range of areas, without any
consideration of the invidiousness of the particular legislation under
review. Similarly, the Court applied the "rational basis" standard of
review in Dandridge. There the effect of the law setting a maximum
limit for welfare payments fell more heavily on blacks than whites,
because a greater percentage of blacks than whites are on welfare and
because blacks on the average have larger families. 0 The Court,
however, chose to treat the Maryland welfare law as a simple economic
regulation and refused to impose the compelling state interest test.
45. 402 U.S. at 141.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 142.
48. Briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in Valtierra demonstrated that some of
the areas involved contained a disproportionate number of non-white peoples. NUC
Brief, supra note 16, at 55, 55; Brief of Appellees Anita Valtierra et al., James v. Valtierra.
402 U.S. 137 (1971). But see p. 75 and note 56 ifra.
49. See pp. 77-80 infra.
50. See CouNcIL oF EcoNomttc ADViSERS, EcoNo~tic R.POT OF TiE P smE.%-r 40 (1971).
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But it would be incorrect to interpret Valtierra and Dandridge as
holding that racially discriminatory impact alone is never sufficient
to require application of the compelling state interest standard. These
cases must be read in light of prior decisions which suggest that the
Court is prepared to invalidate laws which exclusively or almost exclu-
sively harm members of a racial minority. In Reitman v. Mulkey 1
the Court ruled that an amendment to the California Constitution
prohibiting open housing legislation violated the equal protection
clause because it encouraged private racial discrimination, despite the
fact that the amendment was not restricted to laws forbidding racial
discrimination but barred all laws preventing the seller from disposing
of his property to whomever and for whatever reasons lie desired.
Hunter v. Erickson5 2 invalidated on equal protection grounds an
amendment to a city charter prohibiting the city council from imple-
menting any ordinance regulating racial, religious, or ancestral dlis-
crimination in housing without the approval of a majority of the city's
voters. Like the constitutional amendment in Reitman, the referendum
procedure in Hunter applied on its face to discrimination on bases
not limited to race. But as Justice White, who also wrote the Reitman
opinion and was part of the Valtierra majority, observed for the Court:
[A]lthough the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and
gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact
falls on the minority. The majority needs no protection against
discrimination and if it did, a referendum might be bothersome
but no more than that.5
3
Both the Reitman and Hunter Courts reacted to impediments to
open housing legislation which, given the racial animosities of con-
temporary America, would have had inevitably detrimental effects
on the ability of racial minorities to obtain housing. These decisions
suggest that Valtierra must be carefully distinguished from cases in
which (1) the fit of the regulation to racial minorities is tight, i.e.,
where those affected by the regulation, as in Reitman and Hunter, are
all or almost all members of a racial minority, and (2) the harm to
51. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
52. 293 U.S. 385 (1969).
53. Id. at 391. In a separate line of cases, the Supreme Court has stated that although
multi-member voting districts are not per se unconstitutional, they violate the equal
protection clause in a particular case if it can be shown that they operate to "minimize"
or "cancel out" the voting strength of a racial minority. See Burns v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965), Just last term the Court
reaffirmed its position that multi-member districts may have an unconstitutional dis.
criminatory impact on racial minorities in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971),
though it found the proof offered in that case to be inadequate.
Vol. 81: 61, 1971
Equal Protection and Exclusionary Zoning
those affected can be clearly demonstrated. Such a distinction is not
only suggested by recent precedents, but also strongly supported by
the fact that de facto classifications possessing these two features
have the same characteristics of invidiousness which render de jure
racial classifications suspect.54 The act of placing a racial minority
in an exclusive or nearly exclusive class detrimental to its interests
can have a severe stigmatizing effect even in the absence of explicit
de jure language. In addition, there is a great danger of majoritarian
oppression when those harmed are exclusively members of a racial
minority. Legislatures and voters may cast burdens upon racial mi-
norities which they would not be prepared to force other groups to
bear. Finally, it is doubtful that classifications which harm only racial
minorities are necessary to the pursuit of legitimate legislative goals.
They will frequently be grossly over- or under-inclusive.
It is clear that the fact situations in Dandridge and Valtierra satis-
fied neither the "fit" nor "harm" criteria. This is obviously true of
Dandridge, since a substantial number of welfare recipients with
large families were white. 5 The Valtierra Court also may have felt that
the "fit" of Article XXXIV was too loose to warrant the imposition of
the compelling state interest test. For example, the brief of appellant
Shaffer in Shaffer v. Valtierra, the companion case to James v. Valtierra,
pointed out that "only 1.4% of the households [in one of the areas to
be served by the public housing project in question] of an income
of $3,000 or less are Negroes."' ' l In addition, Valtierra involved cir-
cumstances which are only sometimes disadvantageous to racial mi-
norities. The defeat of a single housing proposal in a referendum
would not necessarily be harmful. For it is open to doubt that every
housing project proposed on behalf of racial minorities actually bene-
fits them. Distance from jobs and schools, effect on traffic patterns,
availability of more desirable alternatives, and a host of other con-
siderations might weigh against the desirability of any particular
project. Valtierra might have been decided differently if the Court
had been confronted with a record establishing that the referendum
procedure operated to deprive blacks or other racial minorities of
an adequate supply of low-cost housing.
54. See p. 70 supra.
55. Cf. COUNCIL OF Ecoxo.tc ADVISERS, EcoSoMic REPORT OF TIlE PRE:D1E.%F 40 (1971).
56. Brief of Appellant Shaffer at 30, Shaffer v. Valtierra. 402. U.S. 137 (1971). This
fact must have greatly diluted the impact of the appellees' statement:
[In the nation as a whole] racial minorities are over.represented in the low-income
group and in the occupation of overcrowded housing.
Brief of Appellees Anita Valtierra et al., Shaffer v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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Although it is obvious that exclusionary zoning does not always
principally harm racial minorities, doubtless there are instances in
which restrictive zoning policies meet the "fit" and "harm" criteria.
For example, Kennedy Park Homes v. Lackawannaa7 in which the
court of appeals suggested that racially discriminatory effect alone is
sufficient to require the compelling state interest test, differed from
Valtierra and Dandridge in these two critical respects. The district
court in Lackawanna found that those excluded by the city's zoning
practices were almost exclusively blacks and that they were clearly
harmed by being deprived of access to adequate low-cost housing.58
Unfortunately, there is no magic percentage at which the fit auto-
matically becomes tight. Nevertheless these two distinguishing char-
acteristics would, in general, permit courts to protect racial minorities
from the consequences of exclusionary zoning in those cases where
the community's action is most invidious."
B. Wealth as a Suspect Classification and Housing as a
Fundamental Interest: A Benefit-Burden Distinction
Dandridge and Valtierra seem firmly to reject the broad proposition
that the government has a general obligation to cure existing economic
inequalities or provide an adequate supply of low-income housing.
But they do not foreclose the possibility that under some circumstances
classification by wealth is suspect and the interest in housing funda-
mental. Rather than representing an abrupt departure from the "new
equal protection," Dandridge and Valtierra can be reconciled with
previous decisions fully cognizant of the stringent judicial scrutiny
required to protect basic values.
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that suspect
classifications and infringements of fundamental interests are to be
57. 518 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), afrd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
58. In SASSO, too, the fit was close and there was clearly demonstrated harm, Sec
SASSO v. Union City, Civil No. 51590 (N.D. Cal., July 30, 1970).
59. It would seem that the arguments made in this section are also relevant to wealth
and housing and that those made in the next section are also relevant to race. Surely
classifications which exclusively disadvantage the poor possess certain invidious charac-
teristics. See p. 70 supra. Nevertheless wealth classifications are at least slightly less
invidious than racial classifications and, probably unlike the latter, seem to lose much
of their invidious quality when created by a remedial program, such as publicly financed
housing. Cf. O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups
to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 709-11 (1971) (regarding beneficent racial classi.
fications). The same applies to housing as a fundamental interest. Clearly a demonstration
that the referendum procedure in Vallierra operated to deprive citizens of decent housing
would have been necessary to establish that an interest in housing had been Infringed,
This section will argue, however, that such a showing may not have been sufficient,
given the fact that the referendum applied only to publicly financed housing.
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presumed unconstitutional,60 it has displayed much greater flexibility
in defining when classifications are suspect and interests fundamental.
Past decisions reveal that despite its explicit statements concerning
the fundamental nature of the franchise and the suspect nature of
wealth classifications, the Court has refused to declare that all gov-
ernmental action making it significantly more difficult for one group
to exercise the franchise than another or primarily affecting the poor
automatically triggers stringent judicial scrutiny. In particular, the
Court has generally refused to apply the compelling state interest
standard to distinctions of a suspect character or which restrict fun-
damental interests when the challenged legislation is of a remedial
nature. Where the government has voluntarily shouldered the bur-
den of extending fundamental interests and reducing discrimination
aginst a specially protected class to a degree beyond that which the
Constitution demands,"' the Court has been unwilling to demand
more than rationality. This theme is best illustrated, ironically enough,
by two cases often cited as examples of the expansive scope of the
equal protection theory developed by the Warren Court,02 Katzenbach
v. Morgan 3 and McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners.04
Morgan involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(e)
of the Voting Rights Act of 196507 prohibiting the application of
English language literacy tests to, inter alia, those educated in Spanish
language schools in Puerto Rico. Among the arguments considered
by the Court was the contention that the prohibition of the enforce-
ment of English literacy requirements only for those educated in
foreign language schools within the jurisdiction of the United States
and not for those educated in foreign language schools beyond the
territorial limits of the United States violated the Fifth Amendment.A
It would seem that a compelling state interest standard was in order.
The remaining literacy tests clearly placed a significant burden on
the right to vote of those educated in foreign language schools outside
60. See pp. 67-71 supra.
61. As a theoretical matter it does not follow from the fact that an interest in a good
is fundamental that the government is obligated to provide it. The steady erosion of the
state action requirement in such areas as racial discrimination, voting rights, and judicial
rights, however, renders this distinction of little practical significance.
62. See Note, Exclusionaty Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HAav. L. REv. 1645, 1653
n. 64 (1971).
63. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
64. 394 U.S. 802 (1969). See also Schilb v. Kuebel, 40 U.S.L.W. 4107 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1971).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1970).
66. See 384 U.S. at 656. The Fifth Amendment incorporates the Fourteenth Amend.
ment's notion of equal protection. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969);
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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the United States. In addition, since the exemption from English
language literacy tests almost exclusively affected those of Puerto
Rican origin,67 it appears that the classification was drawn along racial
lines. 8 The majority, however, disagreed. "Section 4(e)," Justice
Brennan wrote, "does not restrict or deny the franchise but in effect
extends the franchise to persons who otherwise would be denied it
by state law."60 Consequently,
the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in
laws denying fundamental rights . . . is inapplicable; for the
distinction challenged by appellees is presented only as a limita-
tion on a reform measure aimed at eliminating an existing barrier
to the exercise of the franchise.70
The premise implicit in the Court's reasoning was that Lassiter v.
Northampton Election Board,71 which upheld the constitutionality of
literacy tests against an equal protection attack, was still good law; that
is, by abolishing English language literacy tests for some the govern-
ment was operating beyond the scope of constitutional compulsion'
A similar problem was resolved in a similar manner a few years
later in McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, which dealt
with a challenge by county jail inmates awaiting trial to an Illinois
absentee voting statute that failed to include them among those
entitled to vote in absentia. The appellants argued that the distinction
which the statute made between unsentenced inmates within their
resident counties and other absentees could not survive the stringent
judicial scrutiny appropriate in voting rights cases. Chief Justice
Warren, writing for the Court, readily accepted the proposition that
legislation which curtails the right to vote or draws lines on the basis
of race or wealth must be closely scrutinized. 73 Nevertheless, the Court
concluded that for two reasons it was "not necessary" to examine
closely the Illinois absentee provisions: they were not drawn on the
67. See 384 U.S. at 645 n. 3.
68. The Court might have been more disturbed by the invidious qualities of remedial
legislation which, rather than aiding one sub-class of Spanish speaking people more
than others, benefited English speaking voters more than Spanish speaking voters. Sec
note 77 infra.
69. 384 U.S. at 657.
70. Id.
71. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
72. Interestingly and consistently, Justice Douglas, who had concluded in Cardona
v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966), that English language literacy tests were unconstittittonal
as applied to persons literate in Spanish, refused to join this portion of the Court's
opinion. 384 U.S. at 658.
73. See note 32 supra.
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basis of wealth or race, and it was the right to receive absentee ballots
rather than the right to vote that was at stake. At first glance the Court
appeared to be denying in one breath what it had affirmed in the
previous one. The strong correlation between those lacking funds
and those failing to meet bail clearly established that Illinois' failure
to extend the absentee ballot to pretrial detainees fell principally
upon the poor, and it is plainly incorrect to argue that tie failure to
grant the absentee ballot to these prisoners did not curtail their right
to vote if the term "right" also includes ease of exercise. 74 Furthermore,
the burden placed upon the right to vote of those who could not
afford bail was far from insubstantial. Although tie Court never clearly
articulated why the compelling state interest standard was inappropri-
ate, its opinion emphasized various factors which might explain its
holding. The Illinois statute, the Court noted, was essentially "re-
medial."7 Rather than placing obstacles in the way of voting, Illinois
had chosen to expand the right. The Court was not prepared to rule
that states have a duty to provide absentee ballots for those, rich
or poor, unable to appear at the polls, and since Illinois had en-
acted reforms beyond the area of constitutional compulsion, the
exacting scrutiny ordinarily applied to legislation creating suspect
classifications or infringing fundamental interests was considered to
be inappropriate.
70
McDonald and Morgan seem to stand for the proposition that there
are certain limits to the government's constitutional obligation to
further fundamental interests and relieve the plight of racial minorities
and the poor, and that when remedial action is undertaken outside
the area of constitutional compulsion the stringent judicial scrutiny
normally triggered by the presence of fundamental interests and suspect
classifications is no longer appropriate. Although there is obviously
room for disagreement concerning the precise scope of the government's
74. The Court observed that there was no showing that Illinois might not find other
means to permit appellants to vote such as setting up polling booths in the jail. 394 U.S.
at 808 n. 6. It is apparent from the opinion as a whole, however, that the Court regarded
this rather speculative possibility as being unnecessary for its conclusion. Indeed, if the
Court had felt otherwise, it would have been improper for it to proceed to an adjudi-
cation of the constitutional issue on the unlikely basis that such a situation prevailed
rather than remanding the case for a determination of this factual issue. Cf. Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 594 (1969).
75. 394 U.S. at 811.
76. The Court described Illinois' absentee ballot voting provisions as "a consistent
and laudable state policy of adding, over a 50-year period, groups to the absentee cov-
erage as their existence comes to the attention of the legislature. That Illinois has not
gone still farther, as perhaps it might, should not render void its remedial legislation,
which need not, as we have stated before, 'strike at all evils at all times.'" 394 U.S. at
811 (citations omitted).
The Yale Law Journal
obligations, a distinction between laws falling short of constitutional
standards and those going beyond the Constitution's commands appears
to be plausible. As a practical matter, the application of a compelling
state interest standard to statutes designed to assist and enhance the
very groups and interests that the standard was designed to protect
might do more harm than good by discouraging such remedial legis-
lation. More importantly, however, classifications created by remedial
programs are probably less invidious than they would otherwise be. 7
The above analysis serves to distinguish Dandridge and 'altierra
from the problem of exclusionary zoning. The Dandridge Court may
well have reasoned that rather than disproportionately disadvantaging
the poor through governmental action, the Maryland statute merely
refused to extend assistance on an equal basis to a sub-class of the
poor, viz. those with large families.78 Implicit in such an approach is
the assumption that welfare, at least above a very minimal level, is not
constitutionally required. Valtierra also sustained the constitutionality
of a provision which at first glance appears to burden the poor heavily
and, in addition, impair seriously efforts to increase the supply of
low-income housing. Nevertheless Valtierra, like Dandridge, dealt with
a legislative scheme of a remedial nature which arguably went beyond
the government's constitutional obligations. It is important to observe
that Valtierra only involved a barrier to the building of publicly
financed housing. Those Justices who upheld Article XXXIV might
have reasoned that since government does not have a constitutional
obligation to supply the poor with adequate housing, the citizens of
a community who bear the costs of subsidized housing should be able
to decide whether they wish to spend their tax money in such a way7 0
77. Thus this approach does not revive the rght-privilege distinction. The latter has
been justly criticized because due process serves an equally important function regardless
of how the courts label the good at stake. When governmental action has a remedial
thrust of the type discussed above, however, the very factor which persuaded the courts
to apply the compelling state interest test in the first place, i.e., invidiousness, Is dl.
minished. See p. 70 supra. Of course, courts should demand a conclusive demonstration
that a fundamental right is being extended or the plight of a special judicially protected
group is being alleviated. Equally important is judicial insistence upon a close correlation
between the manner in which a right or group is affected by the legislation and the
manner in which the right or group is ostensibly being aided. Otherwise a community
might contend that its exclusionary zoning statutes should escape stringent judicial
scrutiny because it had voluntarily agreed to extend sewer service to all residential
housing. The compelling state interest standard should probably be applied to remedial
legislation enhancing fundamental rights and the position of judicially protected groups
unless it can be shown that all such rights and groups affected are benefited in a manner
identical to the subject matter of the classification made by the statute. Furthermore,
stringent scrutiny should also be applied to all such remedial legislation which excludes
racial minorities or the poor from its benefits.
78. 597 U.S. at 485.
79. 402 US. at 143 (1971).
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Exclusionary zoning, however, raises considerations very different
from those present in Dandridge and Valtierra. It is one thing to
contend that the government does not have an obligation to provide
welfare benefits or an adequate supply of low-income housing, but
quite another to permit it to depart from the neutrality of the free
market and create special impediments to the construction of low-
cost housing. Thus, exclusionary zoning presents a question much
closer to Hunter v. EricksonS°O-in which appellants requested that
the government not impose special barriers against efforts to end
private discrimination-than to Valtierra. Exclusionary zoning affects
the right of the poor to purchase nonsubsidized as well as subsidized
housing by denying permission to build low-cost housing within the
zoned community. An attack on exclusionary zoning need not argue
for remedial legislation, but only that the poor be allowed the same
opportunity as others, namely noninterference with their right to
build, buy, and rent housing within their means in the suburbs. The
Court may be prepared to recognize the interest in housing as suf-
ficiently fundamental and/or wealth classifications as sufficiently sus-
pect to insist upon stringent judicial scrutiny of all impediments
placed by the government in the path of private efforts to achieve an
adequate supply of low-cost housing.8'
C. The Sliding Scale Constitutional Test
Since Valtierra and Dandridge involved wealth classifications and
a housing interest different from those present in exclusionary zoning
statutes, 2 these cases do not rule out the possibility that the com-
bination of the wealth and racial classifications created and the hous-
ing interest affected by suburban zoning laws is sufficient to merit
the imposition of the compelling state interest standard. s3 The virtue of
such an approach is that it permits the courts to subject to strict
scrutiny those wealth and de facto racial classifications and those
burdens on the interest in housing which have a significant cumulative
invidious impact, without committing themselves to applying this
rigorous standard in all cases where any one of these classifications or
80. 393 U.S. at 385 (1969).
81. One might also attempt to distinguish Valtierra on the grounds that it was mainly
concerned with the preservation of the right of people to use the democratic tool of
referendum. It is not dear, however, why the court would give preference to discrimina-
tory action approved by referendum over discriminatory action approved by state
legislatures or city councils.
82. See pp. 73-81 supra.
83. See pp. 71-72 supra.
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interests can be detected. By applying the sliding scale approach
coupled with an analysis of racial and wealth classifications and hous-
ing interests such as that proposed above,84 the Court could restrict
stringent review to those regulations, such as exclusionary zoning
statutes, which most seriously inhibit social and economic mobility
and deprive racial minorities and the poor access to such basic needs
as decent housing and employment.
IV. Fashioning Relief
Intervention in the area of exclusionary zoning is unlikely unless
courts are convinced that effective and judicially manageable stand-
ards for granting relief exist. Clearly, remedies in the area of housing
will turn on local circumstances, but general goals can be enunciated.
First, fairness and urban realities indicate that remedies should treat
low-cost housing as a metropolitan problem and should require that
such housing be spread throughout metropolitan areas. Second, con-
tinued use of zoning for environmental and aesthetic purposes should
be permitted as long as it does not prevent the poor from finding
low-cost housing in the suburbs.* 5 A guideline which required every
community in a metropolitan area to allow enough of its land to be
zoned to absorb a share of the metropolitan area's low-cost housing
approximately equal to its share of the total metropolitan housing
would be a desirable way for courts to translate these perceptions into
a workable remedy. Such a guideline would spread the burdens of a
reduced per capita tax base throughout metropolitan areas yet would
permit land-use planning consistent with aesthetic and environmental
needs.
Although requests for variation from the guideline should require
strong justification, downward variances should be permitted and
upward variances ordered under certain circumstances. Variances from
the guideline should be based upon the ability of a community to
provide low-income residents with adequate public services and the
means necessary for upward mobility, for example, good public edu-
cation and proximity to job markets. Under no circumstances should
a community be forced to open all its land to low-cost housing or be
84. See pp. 73-81 supra.
85. Zoning is the main land-planning tool, and courts will be hesitant to abolish It
in the face of its great popularity and long use for aesthetic and environmental purposes,
Indeed, as the issues of environment and land aesthetics are popularized, it becomes
more necessary than ever to demonstrate that the introduction of low-cost housing into a
community need not do harm to either the aesthetics or the environment of a community,
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allowed to exclude such housing completely. Nearly every suburban
community is able to provide some low-income families with the means
necessary for social and economic advancement, s0 and no community
would find it fiscally possible to provide these means if it were popu-
lated only by very poor families.
No matter how conscientiously this guideline approach is followed,
however, it is unlikely that such a remedy will suffice to cure the
results of past exclusionary zoning practices. As pointed out above,s7
exclusionary zoning has injured low-income families by artificially
raising the price of land available for low-cost housing, thereby in-
hibiting the construction of such housing. Unfortunately, there are
at least two reasons for expecting the adverse effects of exclusionary
zoning to linger. First, there will probably be a considerable time lag
between the elimination of exclusionary zoning and the impact of
the "freed" market on artificially high property values.88 Second, land
previously zoned to exclude low-income housing has generally been
devoted to alternate uses over the years and will remain more ex-
pensive than it was prior to development.89 But a minimum standards
approach, according to which the government would be compelled
to provide everyone with adequate housing, seems unlikely to be
adopted by the Supreme Court after Dandridge and Valtierra.00
Nonetheless, the minimum standards argument is not the only doc-
trinal means of imposing an obligation upon communities to help
finance low-cost housing. Instead the Court might turn to the com-
pensatory approach employed in Hobson v. Hansen,01 which ordered a
wide range of measures to bring the Washington, D. C., school system
back into the structural position it would have occupied had there been
no history of unconstitutional discriminatory action favoring white
middle-class students over black students. Similarly, in United States
v. Plaquemines Parish Board of Education92 and United States v.
Jefferson County Board of Educatiol,9 3 school systems were ordered
86. As was pointed out in note 12 supra, the mere racial and economic integration of
schools is beneficial to the children of low-income families, even if the per student ex-
penditure in integrated schools is no higher than in non-integrated schools.
87. See pp. 62-63 supra.
88. It will take builders a significant period of time; they will have to acquire land
and construct new buildings.
89. See, e.g., REGIONAL PL.N AssoctATiov, SPREAD Crr" 21-25 (1962).
90. See pp. 70-71, 80 supra.
91. 269 F. Supp. 401, 514-18 (D.D.C. 1967), af'd sub nons. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d
175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
92. 291 F. Supp. 841, 846 (E.D. La. 1967).
93. 380 F.2d 385, 394 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1001 (19671). SASSO v.
Union City, Civil No. 51590 (N.D. Cal., July 30, 1970), can also be interpreted as imposing
its remedy based on a compensation theory.
The Yale Law Journal
to provide remedial programs for blacks who had been disadvantaged
by inferior all-Negro schools. Analogously, there is little question that
excessive cost of land and the low-cost housing shortage in the suburbs
are largely a product of past discriminatory zoning practice.9 1 It seems
just, therefore, that communities which have used unconstitutional
means to deny decent housing to minorities should be required to
bear the expense of compensatory housing programs designed to
overcome the pernicious effects of past unconstitutional conduct.05 The
sum of a community's compensatory obligation to build low-cost hous-
ing should be the amount of such housing which would have been
built but for the community's exclusionary zoning policies. Although
precise amounts may be difficult to calculate (as they are in the
education area) 91 the alternative is to vindicate constitutional rights
in form rather than substance, to permit the victims of past discrimi-
natory conduct to continue to suffer at the hands of its perpetrators.
There are several methods of implementing the remedial principles
outlined above. Under a community-by-community approach, locali-
ties would have two alternate ways of fulfilling their low-income
housing obligations. Communities first would have the option of
presenting a zoning plan which meets the guideline91 but also protects
aesthetic and environmental interests. Such a plan would be required
to place plots zoned for low-cost housing within a convenient distance
of schools, major roads, shopping facilities, and other amenities. Of
course, land zoned for low-cost high density housing should be capable
of accommodating such buildings. For example, land zoned for such
use in communities that use septic tanks rather than centralized sewage
facilities must be able to absorb a large quantity of septic flow. The
94. See Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418, 1421, 1427 n. 32 (1969).
95. It will of course be complicated to determine the amount which past discrimina.
tion has cost the poor. However, there is precedent for a court's appointment of an
outside expert to draw up a school desegregation plan. Swann v. Charlotte.Mecklenburg,
306 F. Supp. 1299, 1313 (1969). The federal rules provide for the appointment of a trial
master. 5A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 53.03, at 2921 (2d ed. 1971). A recent federal
district court opinion ordered HUD to find housing-by building it if necessary-for
blacks who had been forced out of their old homes by urban renewal programs. Gartett
v. City of Hamtramck, 40 U.S.L.W. 2361 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 1971).
96. In the education compensation cases the courts did not even attempt to determine
the exact amount of compensation necessary. Instead they ordered that compensatory
programs be instituted to bring the level of achievement of the Black students up to
that of the white students. See United States v. Plaquemines Parish School Bd., 291 F.
Supp. 841, 846 (E.D. La. 1967), modified and as modified aff'd, 415 F.2d 817 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385, 394 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1001 (1967).
97. Allowance would be made for variance from the guideline according to the corn.
munity's ability to provide its low-income residents with the tools necessary for upward
mobility. See pp. 82-83 supra.
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community would also be required to provide whatever financial
subsidies might be necessary to construct the housing mandated as
part of its compensatory obligation. If, on the other hand, a com-
munity fails to present an acceptable plan, it should be ordered to
grant all requests for variances from existing zoning regulations for
the building of low-cost housing and trailer parks, in the absence of
extreme countervailing considerations, until its low-cost housing obli-
gations are met.98
For a variety of reasons courts would probably prefer a community-
by-community approach. In some states exclusionary zoning may be
present in only a few communities. In addition, zoning, like education,
has traditionally been regarded as a local function. The community-by-
community approach would keep responsibility for meeting constitu-
tional standards in the hands of those local authorities responsible for
exclusionary zoning.99 It would also permit courts to assess the effects
of the remedy in a few communities before undertaking more massive
intervention. Finally, an approach of this type might be the easiest
to administer because it requires courts to immerse themselves in the
complexities of only one community at a time.
Nevertheless, it may in some cases be advantageous to employ a
state-wide remedy requiring the rezoning of the entire state to ac-
commodate the needs for low-cost housing. Hawaii and Vermont,
for example, have enacted zoning statutes which are administered
and enforced by the state.100 In these cases it is clear that zoning is a
state rather than local function and there is no need to fear conflict
with traditional home rule powers. A state-wide remedy also has the
advantage of focusing judicial and public attention on the fact that
the housing needs of the poor are best dealt with by regional plan-
ning, thus taking into account the problems of employment and
education without burdening particular communities with dispropor-
tionate responsibilities. In most states, however, zoning enabling acts
delegate zoning authority to individual communities, and a state-wide
remedy in these instances would conflict with community control over
zoning. Such an approach would also be extremely difficult to ad-
minister, for it would require a judge to review the zoning practices
98. The court would also order the community to provide whatever financial assistance
was required to meet its low-cost housing obligation.
99. A similar approach was taken in the school desegregation cases where courts acted
against local school boards. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (194);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
* 1O0. See VT. GEN. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 6001-6086 (1971); HAWAII RE. STAT. § 305-1 to -15
(1968).
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and consider the special circumstances of hundreds of communities
simultaneously.
The third method, a metropolitan-wide remedy, has the important
advantage of conforming especially closely to the realities of exclu-
sionary zoning. Since the zoning policies of every community affect
other communities and the metropolitan area as a whole, a remedy
which would announce a metropolitan-wide approach to the low-cost
housing problem is very attractive. Of course, some communities will
object that their zoning powers are being seriously diluted. A remedy
of this type, however, would interfere less with traditional home rule
prerogatives than would the state-wide approach. More importantly,
to the extent that low-cost housing presents a problem which can be
fairly and effectively dealt with only on a metropolitan area level, 10 1
some limitations on the autonomy of individual communities appear
to be both necessary and desirable. And to the extent that viable
solutions to the racial and economic stratifications fostered by exclu-
sionary zoning compel planning at the metropolitan level, this method
of fashioning relief may be easier than dealing with individual towns
in isolation. 1
02
101. Failure to examine at least contiguous communities when deciding the appro-
priateness of a community's new zoning statute may result in all of the low.income
families of each community being zoned into adjoining neighborhoods, creating a ghetto
of low-income housing. It is important that the new zoning provisions respond to
metropolitan-wide job opportunities, traffic patterns, and location of public services.
102. See Bradley v. School Bd., 40 U.S.L.W. 2446 (D.E. Va. Jan. 5, 1972) in which
Richmond and two contiguous counties were required to adopt a metropolitan student
assignment plan that would consolidate city and county school systems in order to
achieve racial integration in the schools of the three political subdivisions.
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